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Abstract
Since World War II there have been about fty episodes of large-scale mass
killings of civilians and massive forced displacements. They were usually
meticulously planned and independent of military goals. We provide a
model where conict onset, conict intensity and the decision to commit
mass killings are all endogenous, with two main goals: (1) to identify
the key variables and situations that make mass killings more likely to
occur; and (2) to distinguish conditions under which mass killings and
military conict intensity reinforce each other from situations where they
are substitute modes of strategic violence.
We predict that mass killings are most likely in societies with large
natural resources, signicant proportionality constraints for rent sharing,
low productivity and low state capacity. Further, massacres are more
likely in a civil than in an interstate war, as in the latter group sizes
matter less for future rents.
In non polarized societies there are asymmetric equilibria with only the
larger group wanting to engage in massacres. In such settings the smaller
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group compensates for this by ghting harder in the rst place. In this
case we can talk of mass killings and ghting e¤orts to be substitutes. In
contrast, in polarized societies either both or none of the groups can be
ready to do mass killings in case of victory. Under the "shadow of mass
killings" groups ght harder. Hence, in this case massacres and ghting
are complements.
We also present novel empirical results on the role of natural resources
in mass killings and on what kinds of ethnic groups are most likely to be
victimized in massacres and forced resettlements, using group level panel
data.
JEL code: C72, D74.
Keywords: Mass Killings, Civil War, Natural Resources, Intensity of Con-
ict, Group Size.
If ever we are constrained to lift the hatchet against any tribe, we shall never
lay it down till that tribe is exterminated, or driven beyond the Mississippi."
Thomas Je¤erson (from Mann, 2005: 70).
1 Introduction
Mass killings of civilians are obviously a serious problem. Since World War II
some 50 episodes of mass killings have led to between 12 and 25 million civilian
casualties (Political Instability Task Force, 2010) and by 2008 have forced the
displacement of 42 million people (UNHCR, 2009). Surprisingly, while there is
an increasing number of formal models of civil and interstate wars,1 the issues
of mass killings and forced displacements have so far been largely neglected
in formal theory. What makes this neglect even more surprising is that mass
killings seem to have di¤erent causes, motivations and implications with respect
to other forms of conict. Indeed, mass killings are a manifestation of the worst
of the human being, dominated by irrational hatred and uncontrolled passion.
However, in Manns (2005: 9, 31) words, to understand ethnic cleansing we
need a sociology of power more than a special psychology of perpetrators as
disturbed or psychotic people  though some may be. (...) All cases of cleansing
involve material interests. Usually, members of an ethnic group come to believe
they have a collective economic interest against an out-group. In this paper,
we examine whether decisions to exterminate the opponent can be explained as
1See e.g. Blattman and Miguel (2009) and Jackson and Morelli (2009) for the most updated
surveys on civil and interstate wars, respectively
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the result of strategic, rational calculation, independently of how these decisions
had been framed.
The links between mass killings and warfare are complex. While mass killings
are present in many guerrilla wars (Valentino, Huth and Balch-Lindsay, 2004),
there are also often episodes of mass killings perpetuated by the government
in the absence of any armed opposition or rebellion. This was for example
the case in several communist countries (e.g. Cambodia, China during the
Cultural Revolution, Stalinist USSR) or countries governed by military juntas
(e.g. Myanmar) where the state controls most of the economy. Moreover, not all
forms of war are equally likely to be accompanied by mass killings. A substantial
fraction of civil wars entail deliberate mass killings of civil non-combatants on a
large scale, while there is almost no record of mass killings of this sort in post-
WWII interstate wars. As shown in Figure 1, between 1960 and 2000 roughly
a third of all civil wars (50 out of 152) featured mass killings, while in none of
the interstate wars (23) there were mass killings.2
One distinctive feature is that mass killings are designed to kill, i.e. to
reduce the size of the opponent groups, while other forms of conict are about
winning some prizeand the fatalities they entail are merely a by-product of
appropriation. Hence, a natural question to ask is: Why could it be rational for
a regime or group to engage in a costly activity that has as main goal to reduce
the group size of the opponent?
We will highlight the trade-o¤s involved when a group considers the possi-
bility of engaging in decimation of the opposition groups size. While in the
discussion we mostly refer to mass killings, our analysis is meant to include
forced displacements, since they are another measure for reducing the size of
the opposition group.3
In the model we assume that there are two groups,4 one of which initially
controls the government. The government and rebel factions decide rst whether
or not to engage in ghting and on the level of ghting e¤ort. This endogenously
yields the likelihood of the rebel faction taking over power at the end of the
conict. Then the group that is in power has the option to perform mass
killings to decimate the group size of the opponent.
Given that the minimum share of public spending that has to be given to the
2For Figure 1, data on mass killings in wars was taken from Valentino, Huth and Balch-
Lindsay (2004), civil wars data from Collier, Hoe­ er and Rohner (2009), and data on interstate
wars from Gleditsch and Ward (2007). According to Valentino, Huth and Balch-Lindsay (2004)
the only mass killings during interstate war in recent decades took place during the Korean
War, 1950-53 (which shared many features with civil wars).
3Given that the model will not distinguish between reductions of the size of a group by
killing and by forced displacements, we are basically thinking about the sum of the two. A
separate research question could then be the study of the tradeo¤s between these potentially
substitute elimination methods.
4These groups could be identied by any of the dividing lines in society, ethnicity, religion,
race, class. We abstract from these distinctions. Also, we will not explicitly deal with more
fractionalized societies. The countries with two large identiable groups are empirically by
far the most dangerous places in terms of likelihood of the events we aim to rationalize (see
below), hence we consider the di¢ cult extension to more than two groups something of low
priority in the research agenda.
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opposition group depends on their group size, mass killings allow the government
group to increase their future rent share. This incentive has to be traded o¤
against the reduction in economic output following mass killings. We nd that
mass killings are more attractive for the group in power when natural resource
rents are large relative to economic production, and when state capacity is
weak. Further, democratization and constraints on rent-sharing imposed from
the outside can give incentives for the ruling group to substitute discrimination
with elimination. Paradoxically, if abad" regime is forced to treat minorities
better than it otherwise would, this could fuel massacres, as killing opponents
becomes more lucrative if the share of the rents is more closely tied to group
sizes. Further, it is found that large groups have greater incentives to engage
in mass killings. This implies that in polarized societies there are symmetric
equilibria where either both or none of the groups commit massacres, while in
less polarized societies only the larger group performs mass killings.
A recent, still ongoing case can illustrate the key features of mass killings that
we wish to capture. The mass killings in Sudans Darfur region started in 2003.
The primary perpetrators of the killings and expulsions are government-backed
Arabmilitias. The main civilian victims are black Africans" (Straus, 2005:
123). The estimates of the death toll vary between 70,000 and 400,000 fatalities,
with an estimated 1.8 million people displaced (Straus, 2005, 2006; De Waal,
2007). This corresponds to a signicant fraction of the total population in this
region, which was about 6.5 million before the outbreak of the crisis. The killings
are clearly strategic, directed by the state, targeted at a particular ethnic
population, and intended to destroy that ethnic population in substantial part
(Straus, 2006: 43). The early 21st century was characterized by natural resource
shocks (Sudan becomes an increasingly important oil producer) and political
shocks (peace agreements in other parts of Sudan brought the expectation of
looming elections and democratization) (Straus, 2005). At the same time
productivity and state capacity of Sudan remained very low, and it became
increasingly clear that the international community would be hesitant to rapidly
and forcefully intervene (Straus, 2005; 2006; De Waal, 2007). These factors led
to an explosive blend that made the mass killings in Darfur possible. Our paper
contributes to bring together all these factors in a unied model of strategic
interaction.
Our framework also yields interesting predictions on how massacres and
warfare relate to each other. When selecting the optimal ghting levels, the
groups take into account what levels of mass killings take place for each poten-
tial outcome of the battle. In asymmetric equilibria  hence at low levels of
polarization the smaller group, which would not start massacres after victory,
will compensate for this by ghting harder in the rst place. Thus, in those
equilibria mass killings and warfare behave as substitutes. In contrast, compar-
ing across symmetric equilibria  hence with high polarization mass killings
and warfare behave as complements, i.e. the "shadow of massacres" makes both
groups ght harder.
According to our theory, there is a fundamental di¤erence between civil
wars and interstate wars. The objective of a civil war is to impose a new social
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arrangement or new social contract, as desired by the ethnic group that rebels.
In contrast, interstate wars do not challenge any status quo social contract, nor
is there any wish to impose new sharing rules for common pools of resources,
also because there is no supranational government budget to ght for in terms of
entitlements or alike. In civil wars, reducing the population size of the opponent
group  by extermination and/or exile allows for a larger viable share in
the new social arrangement. This factor does not play such a strategic role in
interstate conicts because across countries di¤erent groups have no enforceable
claims. This is not to deny that arguments such as revenge, hurt pride and alike
play a role in both types of wars. However, our point is that the payo¤ to
mass killings is distinctly larger and strategically critical in domestic conicts,
as group sizes matter for future rents, which is not the case in interstate wars.
While mass killings have received a lot of media attention and there is a
substantial empirical literature on them (as discussed below), formal theoretical
research on mass killings has been very scarce. There are a few papers that study
terror and intimidation of the civilian population (Azam and Hoe­ er, 2002) or
build rent-seeking models to account for government appropriation (Bae and
Ott, 2008). Further, Bueno de Mesquita (2010) builds a model where violence
against civilians is used by the revolutionary vanguard to signal the level of anti-
government sentiment in society to increase support for their cause.5 However,
to the best of our knowledge, we build the rst game-theoretic model of the
incentives of a given ethnic group to deliberately decimate the population share
of the opponent group for strategic reasons.
While the present paper is mainly theoretical, we also present several novel
empirical ndings, for example with respect to the impact of natural resources
on mass killings. To the best of our knowledge, this is the rst paper to perform
an econometric analysis of massacres and displacements with a panel at the
ethnic group level, which allows us to observe what kinds of ethnic groups are
most likely to be victimized.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we report on the
existing empirical evidence in the literature. Section 3 sets up the model, stud-
ies the strategic behavior of the two groups and establishes the existence and
uniqueness of a subgame perfect equilibrium. Section 4 displays the important
comparative statics, showing the e¤ects of changing the relative group sizes, pro-
ductivity, natural resources, State capacity, and limits to permissible inequality.
Section 5 summarizes the main ndings, discusses possible extensions, and sets
the stage for Section 6, where we present new empirical evidence. Section 7
concludes.
5Qualitative micro-level explanations of rebel group behavior include Humphreys and We-
instein (2006) and Kalyvas (2007).
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Figure 1: Mass killings in interstate and civil wars
2 Stylized Facts
2.1 Denition of Mass Killings
Building on Charny (1999: 7) and Easterly, Gatti and Kurlat (2006: 132) we
can dene mass killings in the following way: Mass killings are the killings
of substantial numbers of human beings, when not in the course of military
action against the military forces of an avowed enemy, under the conditions of
the essential defenselessness and helplessness of the victims. In the literature
this class of phenomena is referred to sometimes as genocide, sometimes as mass
killings, mass murder, massacres. Rudolph Rummel uses the expression demo-
cide, while some scholars use politicide (political mass murder). We have
opted for the general use of the term mass killing, which was also the solution
adopted by Easterly, Gatti and Kurlat, 2006) and for the use of genocide only
in the case in which one group is completely exterminated. For our empirical
investigation we will rely on the most widely used dataset on mass killings, col-
lected by the Political Instability Task Forceunder the direction of Barbara
Har¤. The most accepted quantitative minimum threshold for a massacre to
count as mass killing is 50,000 (i.e., a mass killing is an intentional massacre of
civilians with at least 50,000 fatalities).
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2.2 The Quantitative Importance of Mass Killings and
Forced Migration
Let us start the review of the stylized facts by giving an overview of the impor-
tance of mass killings. The exact numbers of fatalities are controversial,6 but
they are substantial by any standards. According to the Political Instability
Task Forcethere have been 50 events of mass killings since World War II and
they have cost the lives of between 12 and 25 million noncombatants. Bae and
Ott (2008) use even larger numbers: The conict-related deaths in the 20th cen-
tury were as large as 109.7 millions, corresponding to 4.35 percent of the world
population. Of these, 60 percent were civilian non-combatants. Rummel (1995)
estimates that the number of civilians killed by governments in 1900-1987 is
almost 170 million. The punch line is that mass killings matter heavily, both in
absolute terms and relatively to combat-deaths.
As explained in the introduction, the mechanisms of our model can also
account for incentives to force unwanted opposition into migration and dis-
placements. These phenomena are quantitatively very important. According to
the o¢ cial statistics of UNHCR (2009), out of the current 42 million forcibly
displaced persons, 26 million were internally displaced population by cause of
civil conict.
2.3 Empirical Literature on Mass Killings
Below we summarize the basic empirical results obtained by the existing lit-
erature. We will revisit these ndings again in section 6 where we test the
predictions of our paper.
1. Political regime. Autocratic regimes are more likely to commit mass
killings than democracies.
Non-democratic regimes are found to be more likely to commit mass
killings than democracies, especially when the autocrats are powerful
(Rummel, 1994, 1995; Har¤, 2003; Valentino, Huth and Balch-Lindsay,
2004; Easterly, Gatti and Kurlat, 2006; Eck and Hultman, 2007; Colaresi
and Carey, 2008). We nd in section 6 that autocracy does not remain a
signicant explanatory variable for mass killings when one addresses the
autocorrelation of the dependent variable and uses simple techniques for
reducing the omitted variable bias.
Unfortunately, the existing quantitative literature focuses almost exclu-
sively on the level of democracy rather than the process of democratiza-
tion, which according to our model should play an important role. How-
ever, there is ample case study evidence available. Based on extensive
historical examples, Mann (2005) argues that regimes newly embarked
6The estimates of how many civilians have fallen in this category vary a lot because of the
di¢ culties in distinguishing between degrees of intentionality and targeting.
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upon democratization are more likely to commit murderous ethnic cleans-
ing than are stable authoritarian regimes.7
2. Group size and power. Mass killings are carried out almost exclusively
by governments. Rebel violence is relatively low-scale. Rebel groups com-
mit more civilian killings if they are militarily strong and after having won
a military battle.
In most cases rebel violence is relatively low-scale, and mass killings are
almost only carried out by governments (Har¤, 2003; Valentino, Huth and
Balch-Lindsay, 2004; Eck and Hultman, 2007).
In the words of Rummel (1994: 1): "Power kills; absolute power kills
absolutely". In order to be able to do mass killings a group needs the
power and military strength to do so. Rebel groups commit more civilian
killings if they are militarily strong relative to the government (Hultman,
2009) and after having won a military battle (Bussmann, Haer and Schnei-
der, 2009). Total fatalities are low in situations with weaker rebel armies
(Heger and Salehyan, 2007).
3. Ethnic fractionalization and polarization. High levels of ethnic frac-
tionalization are negatively correlated with the risk of mass killings, while
ethnic polarization is often present in countries experiencing mass killings.
The e¤ect of ethnic cleavages appears to be non-linear, with mass killings
being less likely in fully homogenous societies or in societies with a large
number of ethnic groups, and becoming more likely in the presence of
few large ethnic groups. In particular, Krain (1997), Heger and Salehyan
(2007), Bae and Ott (2008) and Querido (2009) nd that large levels of
ethnic fractionalization reduce the risk of mass killings, while Montalvo
and Reynal-Querol (2008) show that ethnic polarization increases the risk
of mass killings.
4. Economic conditions. Mass killings are most likely for low and inter-
mediate levels of GDP, large natural resources, high inequality and low
trade openness.
It has been found that less mass killings take place in richer countries
(Scully, 1997; Bae and Ott, 2008). When allowing for a quadratic form of
development, an inverted U-shape relationship is found with mass killings
being most risky for intermediate levels of GDP (Easterly, Gatti and
Kurlat, 2006).
Natural resources seem to increase the risk of mass killings in Africa
(Querido, 2009), and also inequality (especially human capital inequality)
7Mann (2005) sees the process of democratization as the main cause of ethnic cleansing:
Stably institutionalized democracies are less likely than either democratizing or authoritarian
regimes to commit murderous cleansing. (...) But their past was not so virtuous. Most of
them committed su¢ cient ethnic cleansing to produce an essentially mono-ethnic citizen body
in the present. In their past, cleansing and democratization proceeded hand in hand." (p. 4)
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tends to increase the risk of mass killings (Besançon, 2005). In contrast,
trade openness reduces the risk of mass killings (Har¤, 2003).
5. International intervention. Interventions tend to reduce mass killings,
but at the beginning of intervention killing e¤orts may increase.
International intervention, when directly directed against the perpetra-
tors, can stop or at least slow down mass killings (Krain, 2005). Buss-
mann, Haer and Schneider (2009) nd that "partisan interventions in civil
wars might deter the main perpetrators from continuing the slaughtering,
but might invite the targets of these acts to seek reciprocal revenge under
the protection of the international community".
6. Civil wars. Mass killings are more likely in the presence of civil war.
In the presence of civil war mass killings are more likely (Krain, 1997;
Valentino, Huth and Balch-Lindsay, 2004), in particular when guerrilla
groups are strong and benet from support in the population (Valentino,
Huth and Balch-Lindsay, 2004).
We should also briey discuss the factors that have been found to increase the
risk of forced displacements. Refugee ows are larger in conjunction with mass
killings, in wars, under dissident repression, in non-democracies and in coun-
tries with low agricultural productivity per worker (Schmeidl, 1997; Azam and
Hoe­ er, 2002; Davenport, Moore and Poe, 2003; Moore and Shellman, 2004).
Davenport, Moore and Poe (2003) nd that when regimes start democratizing,
this can lead to more refugee ows.
The model that we now turn to is heavily inspired by all the stylized facts
of this section.
3 A Model of Civil War and Mass Killings
3.1 The Model
There are two groups, i and j, of population size (Ni; Nj). Hence, total pop-
ulation is N = Ni + Nj . We take the convention that group j is currently in
power.
Output Y is produced by labor. We assume a rigid labor supply, so that
output is proportional to population: Y = N . We can think of  as individual
productivity determined by education as well as by technology. We assume that
both groups carry out their economic activity separately, so that
Yh = Nh; h = i; j; and Y = Yi + Yj : (1)
We assume that both groups have the same productivity.8
8 It is quite obvious that there is sizeable horizontal" inequality among social groups in
most countries. However, there is no conclusive evidence that this inequality is a signicant
source of social conict. Cramer (2005) notes that the same data source appears to lead to
9
In addition, the country obtains an income from the exploitation and export
of natural resources, E, controlled by the government.9
The Government taxes output at a rate t. We can interpret the size of t as
an indicator for the States capacity. Hence, the governments revenue is
G = tY + E = tN + E: (2)
We shall denote by  the share of the tax revenue over the total government
revenues, that is,
  tN
tN + E
: (3)
The government revenue is entirely distributed over the population. The
status quo share of government transfers or entitlements going to group h, h =
i; j, is denoted by g0h: These shares are the outcome of past history and may
result from previous ghts between the two groups. The aggregate disposable
income to group h is
X0h = (1  t)Nh + g0h(tN + E): (4)
This situation may be disrupted by a shock perturbing some of the basic
parameters. For instance, this shock could be originated by a change in the
price or amount of the natural resource relative to the produced output. Such
change may signicantly alter the relative resources of the two groups and induce
the rebellion of the group out of power. After deciding on whether to rebel
or not (rst stage), the challenger and the group in power expend resources
to mobilize forces for battleeld warfare (second stage). The victorious group
seizes (or keeps) power. Power, either conquered or kept, can be used to set
new distribution shares over future government revenues and to perpetrate mass
killings in the opponent population (third stage).10 Figure 2 displays the timing
of the game graphically.
conicting claims in Wintrobe (1995), Collier and Hoe­ er (1998), Stewart (2002), Nafziger
and Auvinen (2002), Cramer (2003), and Besançon (2005). As it will become apparent later
in the paper, assuming di¤erential productivity across groups would modify the results only
in that ceteris paribus the likelihood of becoming a victimized group is higher for the lower
productivity group.
9We will discuss at the end the minor di¤erences in the results that could derive from
allowing natural resource rents to be private property rather than publicly controlled. What
E wants to capture is all the sources of public revenue that do not require intensive labor
input.
10For the sake of expositional simplicity we assume that the ghting groups do mass killings
only after seizing power. It is unquestionable that ghting groups may and sometimes do
combine battleeld warfare with mass killings. However, allowing for mass killings at this
second stage does not seem to add any interesting insight. If killings can be performed in two
periods the groups will have to decide on the timing of the executions. This question might
have some intrinsic interest, but is not at the core of what we want to examine. Furthermore,
empirical evidence suggests that violent conicts do not start with mass killings (see the sixth
thesis on ethnic cleansing by Mann, 2005). Allowing for killings in the two stages would also
permit to compensate for the killings su¤ered from the opposing group in the second stage.
Once more, while this possibility suggests that our model may underestimate the level of
killings, we think that the motivations in this case are adequately captured by our model.
Including this possibility would not add any new insight.
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Groups i and j select fighting efforts Di, resp. Dj
Peace
(Di=Dj=0)
War (Di>0, Dj>0)
i winsj wins
Group j in power, sets
rent-share of group i to
minimum and decides
on mass killings Mj
Payoffs of infinite future received
(depend on group sizes)
Winning probability q depends on Di, Dj
Group i in power, sets
rent-share of group j to
minimum and decides
on mass killings Mi
Group j initially in power
Figure 2: Timing
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We assume that group members act in a coordinated manner so that each
group maximizes the payo¤of the representative group member. Group i decides
to rebel in the rst stage if the groups expected payo¤ from conict exceeds the
payo¤ from remaining peaceful. Rebellion has two possible outcomes: victory
with probability q and defeat with probability (1  q). We use v to denote the
state in which group i wins and d for the state in which i is defeated  and
hence group j is victorious. Therefore, q is the probability that state v comes
about.
The probability of victory q depends on the resources contributed to military
conict by both groups, which we denote by Dh, h = i; j. We assume that
q =
Di
Di +Dj
11 (5)
when Di + Dj 6= 0; when Di = Dj = 0 we assume that the group in power
continues with probability one, i.e. q = 0.
At the third stage of the game, the group h = i; j now in power decides what
number Mh of members of the other group to eliminate.12
We shall denote by Nvi and Ndi the population of group i living at the end
of the game in each of the two states. Equivalently, we shall use Nvj and Ndj ,
with the caveat that Nvj means the population of j when i wins.13
In state v the surviving population will be
Nvi = Ni and Nvj = Nj  Mi: (6)
In state d the surviving population is
Ndi = Ni  Mj and Ndj = Nj : (7)
The probability of survival of an individual of group h in each of the two
states is Nvh=Nh and Ndh=Nh; h = i; j. For individuals of group i the proba-
bilities of being alive and in state v and of being alive and in state d are q and
(1  q)NdiNi , respectively. For individuals of group j they are q
Nvj
Nj
and (1  q).
Therefore, if Xsh is the disposable income of group h in state s, the expected
per capita payo¤ from starting conict U ch=Nh is
U ch
Nh
=
h
q
Nvh
Nh
iXvh
Nvh
+
h
(1  q)Ndh
Nh
iXdh
Ndh
  Dh
Nh
(8)
11The qualitative results are the same for the more general form
q =
(Di)
(Di) + (Dj)
with () strictly increasing and concave.
12The qualitative results do not depend on whether or not killing individuals of the other
group has additional costs, beside the lost future production by them, hence the analysis will
be done without adding any extra cost of killing.
13Recall that we use the term mass killings to denote the decrease in population size pro-
duced by the use of violence against non-combatant civilians. Therefore, this term includes
displacements of the population, as well as the population actually murdered.
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where Xsh = (1  t)Nsh + gsh

tNs + E

.
Since Nh is exogenous and has no inuence on individual decisions, we shall
work with the groups total payo¤ U ch = qXvh + (1  q)Xdh  Dh.
The winning group h imposes the shares gsh; s = v; d; h = i; j on the distrib-
ution of the government revenue in the future. To summarize the possibility that
future conicts may also arise depending on what shares the winner chooses,
we assume that there are constraints on the share that the winner can impose
upon the looser. Specically, we assume that
gvj  Nvj
Nv
and gdi  Ndi
Nd
;  2 [0; 1]: (9)
In each state the winner obtains the rest. The closer  is to unity, the closer
the imposed distribution will be to fairness.
Let us momentarily pause and discuss in more detail the interpretation of
parameter , as it plays a signicant role in our analysis. One specic feature of
a civil conict, as opposed to an interstate conict, is that the players are in an
environment of repeated interaction and there is always going to be a common
government budget and common pool of resources to ght over. The victorious
group replaces a division rule of the common resources a social contract
with another one. However, by how much the new distribution can depart from
an egalitarian sharing  how low  can be is constrained by at least two types
of factors: internal and external.
The internal forces moderating the abuse of the loser by the winner are
the shadow of future rebellions and the degree of commitment to democracy.14
The threat of future rebellions by the losers clearly depends on their numbers.
Hence, the minimum viable share has to be related to the population size of the
losers. Likewise, if we take equal treatment as the quintessence of the democratic
values, the higher is the respect to these democratic values the closer the share
allocated to the loser will be to their population size.
A second type of constraint on the distributional shares is external to the
country and originates in the international pressure for a fairtreatment of the
defeated group as an essential ingredient of democratization. It is a universally
accepted standard of behavior by international organizations to condition aid
or preferential tari¤ treatment, for instance, to the respect of human rights and
to democratic, clean elections. Once more the constraint can be captured by
the closeness of the distributional share to the population size of the losers.
With an admittedly drastic simplication we have pooled together all these
potential pressures for fairness into the parameter . An increase in  can
capture either a process of democratization or a better coordination of the in-
ternational community to impose a "fair" deal.
How will this constraint condition the imposed distribution? A rst ob-
servation is that Uh is strictly increasing in the own shares of the division of
14This commitment can be the outcome of a genuine domestic process or the pressure
exerted by the international community, thus external.
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the government revenue. Hence, the winner will always exploit victory by de-
termining a share for the loser equal to the feasible minimum. This implies
that
gvj = 
Nvj
Nv
; gvi = 1  Nvj
Nv
and gdi = 
Ndi
Nd
; gdj = 1  Ndi
Nd
: (10)
Therefore, the disposable income in the two states will be:
Xvi = (1  t)Ni +

1  Nj  Mi
N  Mi

t
 
N  Mi

+ E

; (11)
and
Xdi = (1  t)(Ni  Mj) + Ni  Mj
N  Mj

t
 
N  Mj

+ E

: (12)
Note that murdering part of the opponents has two e¤ects on ones payo¤.
First, by permanently weakening the opponent in its numbers, the winner can
grant for its own group a larger share of the contested revenue. Second, reducing
the population also reduces the part of the government revenue accruing from
tax collection. The trade-o¤ between these two e¤ects will be crucial in the
analysis, and will lead to some of the most interesting nuanced predictions about
the relative role of the various parameters describing the economic structure of
the country.
In the model, mass killings or any other method to change the distributive
claims of the currently powerless group have the sole purpose of maximizing
the monetary expected payo¤ of the group in power. Thus, the best strategy
is independent of what happened earlier, war or peace. It follows that if group
i decides not to rebel it will enter the third stage as if it had been defeated,
except that it will not have faced ghting cost Di (plus the x costs that we shall
introduce later on). Consequently, this group will be subject to the expected
revised share of government revenue and potentially to mass killings. Taking all
this into account, we have that the payo¤ if i remains in peace, Upi , is
Upi = Xdi = (1  t)(Ni  Mj) + 
Ni  Mj
N  Mj

t
 
N  Mj

+ E

: (13)
We can now turn to the analysis of the strategic behavior of players.
3.2 Mass Killings
We solve the game by backward induction using the solution concept of subgame
perfect equilibrium. In the third stage of the game the group in power is the
only one who has a decision to make. Suppose that i is the winner so that we
are in state v.
The winner selects Mi to maximize the future period payo¤:
Uvi(Mi) = (1  t)Ni +

1  Nj  Mi
N  Mi
  
t(N  Mi) + E

(14)
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subject to the constraint that Mi  M .
The upper bound M corresponds to the maximum level of mass killings
beyond which the international community would intervene and stop killings.
We conceive the intervention by the international community setting M as quite
di¤erent from the pressures for a higher  on three counts. First, while one
is based on the humanitarian objective of sparing the lives of non-combatant
civilians, the other is politically motivated. Second, stopping the mass killings
is done by military intervention following the agreement of the international
community. Typically, the UN Security Council plays a crucial role (Doyle
and Sambanis, 2006). In contrast, the pressures for democratization may not
nd such a unanimous support of the international community and this may
explain why they are typically performed through international agencies such
as the World Bank or the IMF, essentially controlled by the US and the EU.
Third, the threat of international military intervention is activated while the
armed conict takes place, while the pressures for democratization are part
of the post-conict peace agreements and can extend over the future. We thus
consider the two types of international intervention as independent of each other.
We assume that, for instance, there might be an e¤ective cap on mass killings
and no pressure for democratization.15 Symmetrically, there are instances  like
the case of Iraq of pressure for democratization independent of the murders
of the ongoing civil war. Importantly, as shown in Doyle and Sambanis (2006),
there are trends in UN interventionism, and hence our variable M can vary over
time and may be subject to shocks.
Coming back to the optimal choice of mass killings, by di¤erentiating with
respect to Mi we obtain:
@Uvi
@Mi
=
NiE
(N  Mi)2   (1  )t:
Note that for E = 0 we have that @Uvi@Mi < 0, so that the highest payo¤ is
obtained with no mass killings, Mi = 0.
Remark 1 A necessary condition for mass killings is that E > 0.
Di¤erentiating again we have that
@2Uvi
@M2i
= 2
NiE
(N  Mi)3 > 0:
For E > 0, the third stage payo¤ is convex in Mi and hence attains its
maximum at a corner on the interval [0; M ] (while Mj is zero for sure when i
wins in stage 2).
Let us denote by Moi (Ni) the threshold such that Uvi(M
o
i ) = Uvi(0). That
is
Moi (Ni) = N  

1  
1  

Ni (15)
15This corresponds to what Doyle and Sambanis (2006) call "rst generation peacekeeping
operations".
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with  as dened in (3).
The denition of Moj (Nj) is analogous.
The term multiplying Ni in (15) plays a critical role in the analysis of the
third stage of the game. The threshold level Moi is strictly decreasing in this
term and in Ni. Hence higher values of 1 
1 
 and higher relative size of the
group in power make mass killings more likely. Specically, it is critical whether

1 
1 
 > (<)1. Simply note that

1  
1  

> (<)1 as  > (<) :
 is strictly increasing in productivity and State capacity, and it is decreasing
in the natural resources.
It can be easily shown that Xvi( M)  Xvi(0) is increasing in M . Hence, if
M  Moi the subgame perfect equilibrium has to feature Mi = 0. If M > Moi
in the subgame perfect equilibrium we will observe mass killings.
This observation has an important implication: mass murdering is either
performed at a large scale, M > Moi , or not performed at all. In other words,
it is when it is technologically or situationally feasible to implement a large
mass killing (high M) that such an option is likely to be chosen by the group in
power at its maximum feasible level. In contrast, when the maximum amount
of mass killings implementable is not very high (low M) the only continuation
equilibrium is no civilian murdering at all.
The choice of Mi is also subject to another feasibility constraint: the com-
plete extermination of the opponent, Mi  Nj . We say that there is geno-
cide whenever this constraint is binding and Mi = Nj . Therefore, whenever
Moi  Nj , resp. Moj  Ni, we shall have that there will be no killings in the
third stage of the game. In view of (15) this inequality is satised whenever
   :
That is, when  and/or E are small, and Y and/or t large. Notice that this
condition generalizes the result in Remark 1.
Remark 2 A necessary condition for mass killings is that  >  .
Before proceeding to the statement of our formal result, let us give a graph-
ical presentation in Figure 3 of the conditions for mass killings.
On the axes we have group sizes and mass killings bounds and thresholds.
We have drawn a  450 line passing through (N; 0) and (0; N), which represents
the pairs (Ni; Nj) that add up to the given total population, N . The set of
feasible Mi is the area below min( M;Nj), as it is constrained by Mi  M and
by Mi  Nj . After M intersects the  450 line (at Ng = N   M) we have that
Mi = N Ni = Nj and we have genocide with the complete extermination of the
opposing group for all Ni  Ng. Passing through (0; N) we have the straight line
with slope   1  1  that represents equation (15) expressing Moi as a function
ofNi. Clearly, whenever    there will be no mass killings becauseMoi exceeds
16
Figure 3: Mass Killings and Genocides
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the feasible set over the entire range of Ni. This is our Remark 2. Continuing
with Figure 3, consider the value Nk dened by Nk = (N   M) 1  1  where
this line intersects with M . For values of Ni  Nk there will be no killings,
as Moi > M . For Nk  Ni  Ng, mass killings jump up to M until the
binding constraint becomes Nj , on the  450 line. After this point we observe
full genocide.
We can therefore state the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Let group h be in power in the third stage of the game. Let
Nk = (N   M) 1  1  and Ng = N   M . In the subgame perfect equilibrium
strategy
1. Mh = 0 if either    , or  >  and Nh 2 (0; Nk];
2. Mh = M if  >  and Nh 2 [Nk; Ng]; and
3. Mh = N  Nh if  >  and Nh 2 [Ng; N).
With the help of Figure 3, let us now examine how the policy varies as a
function of the di¤erent parameters. We have two possible changes to consider:
variations in the slope of the Moi (Ni) line and variations in M . As the slope of
the Moi (Ni) line becomes steeper, the range of Ni for which there is mass mur-
dering expands at the expense of no killings, but leaves the range of genocides
unchanged. Therefore, rst, if for given Ni we have Mi = Nj , this is indepen-
dent of the parameters determining the slope of the Moi (Ni) line, as long as it
remains less than  1. Secondly, for small values of Ni, if this slope becomes
steeper, it may provoke a jump from no killings to mass murdering at the level
M . This change in the slope depends on , , t, E and N . Larger  and/or E
increase the range of Ni for which there are mass killings. In contrast, increases
in productivity, State capacity and/or in total population16 reduce the range
for mass killings (but leave the range for genocide una¤ected).
As for the e¤ects of lowering M for given Ni when  >  , it will eventually
make mass killings turn into no-killings and turn genocide into mass killings.
We put together these observations in the following Proposition:
Proposition 2 Let  >  . For any given Nh, in the subgame perfect equilib-
rium strategy a su¢ cient decrease in E and/or  and a su¢ cient increase in t; 
and/or N can turn mass killings into no-killings, but has no e¤ect if the strat-
egy was to commit genocide, unless the shift in parameter values is so large that
the zone of mass killings completely disappears. Also, as M decreases, genocide
may turn into mass killings and mass killings may turn into no-killings.
Mass killings can occur when  is too close to unity. When population shares
have to be closely respected it pays to reduce the number of the opponents.
16Notice that an increase in total population has the e¤ect of reducing the weight of E on
GDP. The same e¤ect has increasing .
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Similarly, if the non-produced rent E is too large relative to the tax revenue
tN , exterminating the enemy will have little cost in loss of tax collection.
Using (14), let us nally compute the third stage payo¤s for group i in state
v under the three possible levels of mass killings:
 for Mi = 0 we have
Uvi(0) = (1  t)Ni +

1  Nj
N
  
tN + E

: (16)
 for Mi = M we have
Uvi( M) = (1  t)Ni +

1  Nj  
M
N   M
  
t(N   M) + E: (17)
 for Mi = Nj we have
Uvi(Nj) = Ni + E: (18)
If group i enters the third stage as defeated there is no decision to be taken,
but the payo¤ will be a¤ected by the actions of group j, then in power. The
corresponding payo¤s are
 for Mj = 0 we have
Udi(0) = (1  t)Ni + Ni
N
 
tN + E

: (19)
 for Mj = M we have
Udi( M) = (1  t)(Ni   M) + Ni  
M
N   M
 
t(N   M) + E: (20)
 for Mj = Ni we have
Udi(Ni) = 0: (21)
Notice that these payo¤s are exactly the same player i will obtain if staying
in peace. The payo¤s to player j at the third stage of the game can be computed
analogously.
3.3 Fighting Intensity
In the second stage of the game, players use the payo¤s associated to the best
responses in the third stage and compute the expected payo¤ using the win
probability q. Then each group chooses the amount of ghting resources, Di
and Dj , that maximizes the expected payo¤ as a response to the ghting e¤ort
contributed by the opposing group.
If the rebel group decides to start a conict in the rst period, it has to incur
a xed costK as well. The parameterK can be interpreted as a minimum size of
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necessary investment to have a positive probability of success. This minimum
expenditure includes the establishment of an organization to coordinate the
action and minimum number of armed people the opposition group needs to put
on the ground to start having an impact.17 In order to capture the advantage
of being in power, we have assumed that the ruling group does not face this x
cost.
As seen from the second stage, conict has two possible outcomes (v; d). The
expected payo¤s are
Ui =
Di
Di +Dj
Uvi + (1  Di
Di +Dj
)Udi   (Di + IK); (22)
where I denotes an indicator function taking value 1(0) if group i decides to
(not to) rebel.
Uj =
Dj
Di +Dj
Udj + (1  Dj
Di +Dj
)Uvj  Dj : (23)
The precise values for (Uvi; Udi) and (Udj ; Uvj) are the ones computed in the
previous section.
If group i decides not to rebel (I = 0), group i receives payo¤ Udi with
probability 1 while saving the xed cost of conict; on the other hand, starting
conict and then choosing a zero ghting e¤ort yields the same Udi with prob-
ability 1 but after spending K; hence it can never be part of an equilibrium
behavior to declare war and then put zero ghting e¤ort. Thus, the rst stage
decision to remain in peace or to rebel is equivalent to solving whether Ui is
maximized by Di = 0 or by a strictly positive military e¤ort.
The payo¤ Ui is strictly concave in Di. Di¤erentiating Ui with respect to
Di in (22) we obtain
@Ui
@Di
=
Dj
(Di +Dj)2

Uvi   Udi

  1: (24)
Thus the FOC implies that
Dj
(Di +Dj)2

Uvi   Udi

= 1; (25)
Denoting by i the utility di¤erential Uvi   Udi, (25) can be written as
Di =
p
Dj
p
i  Dj : (26)
From this expression we can easily deduce that
Di
Di +Dj
=
p
i  
p
Djp
i
: (27)
17Small sized revolutionary groups are typically dismantled by the police, without an active
participation of the army. It is only after a movement has reached a threshold level that it
becomes a military threat. This is what K represents.
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Multiplying now by Di both sides of (25) we have
Dj
Di +Dj
Di
Di +Dj
i = Di:
Using this result into (22) and rearranging we obtain the payo¤when choos-
ing Di accordingly with (26)
Ui = Udi +
 Di
Di +Dj
2
i  K: (28)
We can now take into account the x cost K in the choice of the best response.
Combining (28) with (27), we have the following Lemma.
Lemma 1 Let ~Dj be dened asq
~Dj 
p
i  
p
K: (29)
Then, for 0 < Dj  ~Dj the best response by player i is (26) Di =
p
Dj
p
i Dj,
and for Dj > ~Dj is Di = 0. When Dj = ~Dj player i randomizes between the
two responses with arbitrary probability p.
When Dj = 0, the best response by player i is Di = 0 if K  i, otherwise
it is not well dened.18
This Lemma says that if the payo¤ di¤erential between victory and defeat
is small (relative to the x cost of rebelling) the group out of power will choose
peace. When will the payo¤ di¤erential be large? We can obtain these di¤eren-
tials from the payo¤s computed in the previous section from (16) to (21). One
instance is when the group in power will engage in genocide or large scale mass
killings. Also a small  increases the gap between the two payo¤s.
The best reply function is represented in Figure 4. It is concave, starts
at the origin with innite steepness, reaches its maximum when it crosses the
45 degree line, at Di = Dj = i4 , and intersects the axis at Dj = i. At
Dj =
p
i  
p
K
2
<
p
i  
p
K the x cost creates a discontinuity and Di
drops to zero.19
The best reply function of player j is similar to that of player i, except for
two di¤erences. First, player j, being in power, faces no x cost of conict.
Second, if player i chooses Di = 0, its best reply is obviously Dj = 0.
Therefore, we have the following Lemma.
Lemma 2 The best response by player j to Di  0 is given by
Dj =
p
Di
p
j  Di; (30)
18 In this case, in a discretized environment where  > 0 is the smallest positive ghting
e¤ort feasible, it would be optimal to choose Di = , with  arbitrarily small.
19The shape of the best reply is the same as in Esteban and Ray (2010). This is a general
feature of the class of conict games with win probabilities of the form q = (Di)
(Di)+(Dj)
.
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Figure 4:
22
where
j  Udj   Uvj :
We can now proceed to the characterization of equilibrium behavior.
3.4 Equilibrium
An equilibrium is a collection of strategies by each player, (Mi ; D

i ; p
) and
(Mj ; D

j ) such that M

i is optimal for player i in state v and (D

i ; p
) are best
reply to Dj and M

j is optimal for player j in state d and D

j is best response
to (Di ; p
).
Start by noting that both Mi and M

j depend on exogenous parameters.
Therefore, the equilibrium payo¤s in the third stage of the game when the
groups play Mi and M

j also depend on exogenous parameters. So do 

i and
j . Therefore, in order to verify whether an equilibrium exists, we simply have
to check whether the two best reply curves intersect when computed for Mi
and Mj .
Let us for a moment put aside the role of K. Each of the two curves start
at the origin with an unbounded slope, cross the 45 degree line and eventually
intersect the respective axis. Therefore, they intersect and do so only once.
Suppose now that because of K the best reply of player i drops to zero before
intersecting with the other best reply curve. It is immediate that there is a
probability p 2 (0; 1) such that Dj = ~Dj when player i plays a mixed strategy
playing Di =
q
~Dj
p
i   ~Dj with probability p and Di = 0 with probability
(1  p). We have thus proven the following result.
Proposition 3 An equilibrium always exists and it is unique.
We diagrammatically represent an equilibrium in Figure 5. The equilibrium
strategies correspond to the point of intersection of the two best reply curves.
Using (26) and (30) we can readily obtain that the equilibrium ghting e¤orts
are given by
Di = j
 i
j +i
2
; (31)
and
Dj = i
 j
j +i
2
; (32)
whenever Dj < ~Dj and otherwise we have D

j =
~Dj and player i plays a
lottery over Di =
q
~Dji   ~Dj and Di = 0 with probabilities p and (1   p) ,
respectively, with p chosen to make ~Dj a best reply.
Note that when K  i the equilibrium features no battleeld warfare. If
K  i, the equilibrium win probability for group i, q, can be easily computed
to be
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Figure 5: Equilibrium
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q =
i
i +j
: (33)
This expression allows us to rewrite the equilibrium (Di ; D

j ) in a useful
form:
Di = iq
(1  q); and (34)
Dj = jq
(1  q): (35)
Total warfare e¤ort is
D = Dj +D

i =
ij
j +i
: (36)
In the subsequent discussion it will be useful to distinguish between two
possible equilibrium scenarios: symmetric and asymmetric third stage strate-
gies of the groups. An equilibrium will display symmetric behavior if the two
players choose the same equilibrium strategy for the third stage of the game.
An equilibrium is asymmetric otherwise.
We shall denote by h(Mi;Mj) the utility di¤erential between victory and
defeat for a player h under the third stage strategies (Mi;Mj). Note that Mh
can take on one of the following three values f0; M;N  Nhg, corresponding to
no murders, mass killings and genocide of the opponent.
Using (16) through (21) and the equivalent expressions for group j we can
compute the corresponding utility di¤erentials.
Lemma 3 In symmetric equilibria the utility di¤erentials are
i(0; 0) = j(0; 0) = (1  )(tN + E) (37)
and
i( M; M) = j( M; M) = i(0; 0) + 
ME
N   M +
 
1  2(1  )t M ; (38)
for asymmetric equilibria with mass killings are
`( M; 0) = (1  )(tN + E) +  N`
ME
N(N   M)   (1  )t
M; (39)
and
s( M; 0) = `( M; 0) +  M ; (40)
and with genocides are
`(Ns; 0) = tN` + E   N`
N
(tN + E); (41)
and
s(Ns; 0) = `(Ns; 0) + Ns; (42)
where s and ` stand for the smaller and larger group, respectively (here i = `).
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Using now (31), (32), and (33) we can compute the equilibrium winning
probabilities and warfare e¤ort. Note that in an asymmetric equilibrium it has
to be that group ` is the one that is doing mass killings.
Proposition 4 We shall have peace with neither warfare nor mass killings if
and only if K  (1 )(tN +E) and either    , or  >  and N` 2 (0; Nk].
In case of conict, the equilibrium probabilities of winning and ghting e¤orts
are the following functions of the expected behavior after victory:
A. in symmetric equilibria:
q(0; 0) = q( M; M) =
1
2
; D(0; 0) =
j(0; 0)
2
; D( M; M) =
j( M; M)
2
; (43)
B. in asymmetric equilibria with mass killings:
1. when Nj = N`
q(0; M) =
j(0; M) +  M
2j(0; M) +  M
;D(0; M) =
j(0; M) +  M
2j(0; M) +  M
j(0; M);
(44)
2. when Ni = N`
q( M; 0) =
i( M; 0)
2i( M; 0) +  M
;D( M; 0) =
i( M; 0) +  M
2i( M; 0) +  M
i( M; 0);
(45)
C. in asymmetric equilibria with genocide:
1. when Nj = N` > N   M
q(0; Ni) =
j(0; Ni) + Ni
2j(0; Ni) + Ni
; D(0; Ni) =
j(0; Ni) + Ni
2j(0; Ni) + Ni
j(0; Ni);
(46)
2. when Ni = N` > N   M
q(Nj ; 0) =
i(Nj ; 0)
2i(Nj ; 0) + Nj
; D(Nj ; 0) =
i(Nj ; 0) + Nj
2i(Nj ; 0) + Nj
i(Nj ; 0):
(47)
We now proceed to the study of the e¤ect of changes in group size and in the
exogenous parameters on both types of strategic violence that we have analyzed.
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4 Comparative Statics
We shall now examine the e¤ects of the variations of the various key parameters
on the warfare e¤ort and the use of mass killings. To this e¤ect we shall use
the results collected in Lemma 3 and Proposition 4. All the parameters are em-
bodied in the equilibrium di¤erential h; h = i; j, together with the additional
direct e¤ect of  and M in asymmetric equilibria. Since D is strictly increasing
in h, our comparative statics exercises essentially focus on the e¤ects of para-
meter changes on this payo¤ di¤erential. In order to simplify the presentation
we focus on the case in which Nj = N`: the larger group is in power.
4.1 Group size polarization
We start by examining the e¤ects of changes in group sizes on the two types of
violence we deal with.
In the previous section we have seen that equilibrium behavior critically
depends on whether we are in a symmetric or asymmetric equilibrium. When
   both players will choose not to do mass killings and we shall thus observe
symmetric behavior for all levels of group polarization. However, when  > 
equilibrium behavior depends on how polarized society is.
Let us examine the case in which  >  . Start by considering the perfect
bipolar situation with Ni = Nj = N=2. Clearly, in this situation we shall
observe symmetric equilibrium behavior. We can readily compute that the
common strategy will be no mass killings whenever 12
N
N  M  1  1  < 1
and mass killings otherwise. As polarization comes down one group becomes
larger, say Nj , and the other smaller. In view of Proposition 4, when initially
there were no mass killings the fall in polarization will have no e¤ect neither
on q, nor on D, until group j has become su¢ ciently dominant and starts
doing mass killings in the third stage of the game, entering in an asymmetric
equilibrium. If at the perfect bipolar distribution both groups use mass killings
in their strategy, a fall in polarization will eventually make the smaller group
shift to no mass killings.
Using (37) and (38) we can compare symmetric equilibria with mass killings
and without and obtain that
D( M; M) D(0; 0) = 1
2


ME
N   M +
 
1  2(1  )t M =
=
1
2
M
N  M
h
E +
 
1  2(1  )t(N   M)i:
From Remark 2 we know that a necessary condition for there to be mass killings
is that
E > (1  )tN:
Therefore,
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D( M; M) D(0; 0) 
1
2
M
N   M

(1  )tN   (2(1  )t  1)(N   M) > 0
because (1  )t > 2(1  )t  1.
We have thus shown that D( M; M) > D(0; 0). It follows that, if we
compare across symmetric equilibria, mass killings and warfare behave as com-
plements: warfare increases when mass killings is an equilibrium strategy in
symmetric equilibria.
Once the size distribution is such that we are in an asymmetric equilibrium,
the one sided threat of mass killings leads the smaller group i to put much more
warfare e¤ort. We can easily verify that q(0; M) > 12 and their win probability
is thus higher than in a symmetric equilibrium. In asymmetric cases, within
equilibrium behavior suggests that warfare and mass killings are substitutes.
Furthermore, if we compute the warfare e¤ort, we obtain that D(0; M) is
strictly increasing as polarization becomes lower.
We summarize these results in the following Remark:
Remark 3 Concerning the role of the distribution of groups sizes we have ob-
tained the following results:
1. In asymmetric equilibria the small group always puts more warfare e¤ort
per capita than the larger group. As the size di¤erence increases and
polarization falls, both groups ght harder, the di¤erence between their
ghting e¤orts becomes smaller, and q decreases towards 1=2.
2. For very high levels of polarization the total warfare e¤ort is independent
of group size. However, for smaller levels of polarization warfare e¤ort
increases as polarization decreases.
3. Comparing across symmetric equilibria  hence with high polarization
mass killings and warfare behave as complements. However, in asymmet-
ric equilibria  hence at low levels of polarization the group that does not
use the mass killing strategy is the one that puts in more warfare e¤ort.
Thus in those equilibria mass killings and warfare behave as substitutes.
In sum, for high polarization mass killings and warfare are complements,
but for low levels of polarization they are substitutes.
Lets conclude this subsection with some general observations that come out
of the above analysis. One thing that has clearly emerged is that it cannot
happen that the small group is the only one doing mass killings. This seems to
be in line with available evidence underscoring that mass killings and genocides
are primarily carried out by the large ethnic groups, when they are in power.
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A second general observation is that the small group, due to the expected
violent consequences of defeat, has more at stake and hence shows a higher
ghting activity in the battleeld. Irrespective of group size, they never spend
less  over and above the x cost than the large group. The prediction that
the rebel minority will ght relatively harder than the government also seems
aligned with available evidence.
4.2 State capacity and productivity
We have repeatedly seen that the share of the tax revenue over the total govern-
ment revenue,  , plays a determinant role on equilibrium behavior. Increases in
State capacity, t, and in productivity, , both raise  . We now jointly examine
how groups of given size change their behavior as State capacity or productivity
increase.
Using Lemma 3 and Propositions 1 and 4 and bearing in mind that M <
N=2, one can easily obtain the following result:
Remark 4 For all types of equilibrium behavior, symmetric or asymmetric, in-
creases in State capacity, t, or in productivity, , increase the aggregate warfare
e¤ort, but eventually induce to stop mass killings, the smaller group rst and the
larger one later. Hence, increases in t or in  make mass killings and warfare
behave as substitutes.
When we contrast the implications of this result with evidence, we have
an ambivalent reaction. While the smaller likelihood of mass killings seems
to conform to facts, the implication that warfare e¤ort will be larger seems
di¢ cult to reconcile with evidence. Note however, that the precise prediction
of the model is that conditional on there being conict the intensity of warfare
will be positively related to state capacity and productivity.
How likely will it be that we observe peace instead of conict? In view of
Propositions 1 and 4, there being peace (i.e. neither ghting, nor mass killings)
depends on two conditions that have to be simultaneously met. One is that
either  <  or  >  and Nj 2 (0; (N   M) 1  1  ). In this case, increases in
t or in  make this condition more likely to be met. The second condition for
peace is thatK  (1 )(tN+E). Here, increases in t or  make this condition
harder to satisfy. Thus the e¤ects of increase State capacity or productivity run
in opposite directions and we cannot come up with an unquestionable conclusion.
Note however, that the direction of the second e¤ect is caused by the in-
crease of government resources while K is kept constant. According to our
interpretation of K, this should capture the minimum xed costs that has to
be incurred by insurgents to challenge the standing military and police forces
in hands of the government. One could plausibly argue that K should increase
with government resources, thus mitigating or reversing this negative e¤ect and
making peace more likely.20
20Note as well that for simplicity we have normalized the marginal cost of ghting e¤ort
to unity. In reality, however, leaders have to hire soldiers, resp. ghters, whose salaries are
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4.3 Natural resources
Let us now examine the e¤ects of increases in the natural resource generated
rent component of public revenue E on the intensity of warfare, mass killings
and the likelihood of conict.
Using again Lemma 3 and Propositions 1 and 4 we obtain the following
result concerning the natural resources abundance.
Remark 5 For all types of equilibrium behavior, symmetric or asymmetric,
increases in natural resource revenue, E, increase the aggregate warfare e¤ort
and make mass killings more likely. Hence, increases in E make mass killings
and warfare behave as complements.
As a country becomes more resource rich, the government revenue is less
dependent of the productive activity of its population. As the cost of doing
mass killings is lower murdering becomes more lucrative. As for warfare, it
seems natural that the e¤orts are higher the more is at stake.
There is peace (i.e. both ghting and massacres are absent) if and only if:
 either  <  or  >  and Nj 2 (0; (N   M) 1  1  ). Any increase in E
reduces  and this makes the conditions for peace  including the range
of population levels less likely to be met.
 The second condition for peace is that K  (1   )(tN + E). Again,
increases in E make this condition harder to satisfy.
We can thus conclude that an increase in E makes conict and mass killings
more likely. This is consistent with the empirical literature showing that the
presence of natural resources increases the risk of civil war (see for example Ross,
2006, for a survey). The existing evidence on natural resources and mass killings
is very scarce, but we will present in Section 6 some new ndings consistent with
the above predictions.
In the previous subsection we argued that as the government revenue in-
creases so do the army and police forces  and K with them. If this were the
case, the e¤ect of an increase of E on the second condition would be less clear
cut.
4.4 Limits to exploitation
We now deal with the consequences of a tighter pressure for a fair treatment of
the losers, captured by an increase in . There seems to be a well established
view that one of the essential roles of the international community is to stop
unfair treatment of the opposition and to promote democracy. These are seen
as means towards a more peaceful world. Our results challenge that wisdom.
Using once more Lemma 3 and Propositions 1 and 4 we obtain the following
result concerning the tightening of the limits to unfairness.
an increasing function of . Hence, in more productive countries the opportunity cost of
becoming a professional soldier is higher, which makes conict costlier, and peace easier to
sustain.
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Remark 6 For all types of equilibrium behavior, symmetric or asymmetric,
increases in  decrease the aggregate warfare e¤ort, but make mass killings
more likely. Hence, increases in  make mass killings and warfare behave as
substitutes.
According to our model, while a moderate pressure for fairness may be bene-
cial in that it reduces the intensity of warfare, a tight pressure may precipitate
mass killings. The rationale is that the tighter the limitations to unfairness, the
smaller is the gain in case of victory for the given population. This makes mass
killings the most protable strategy. External intervention, while having a long
run positive e¤ect, may in the short run trigger episodes of mass killings.
But, will an increase of pressure for fairness and democracy enhance or
hinder peace? Following the same steps as in the previous subsections we can
see that it will have an ambiguous e¤ect on the likelihood of peace. While the
rst condition is harder to meet, the second condition is easier with an increase
in . Once more the overall result is ambiguous.
Notice, however, that if the second condition is met but not the rst one
the model predicts that the government will do mass killings even without an
uprising. Therefore, if a non-democratic country had been in peace and is
induced to commit to democratization, our model predicts that the government
may murder part of the opponents before starting the democratization process.
4.5 The "shadow" of mass killings
Even though the conditions for mass killings have been already dealt with when
analyzing equilibrium behavior, we wish to briey discuss the specic role of
the "shadow" of mass killings on strategic behavior.
We have shown that in non polarized societies, where only the larger group
wants to commit massacres, mass killings and battleeld warfare are substitutes,
in the sense that the smaller group compensates for the fear of decimation
if defeated by ghting harder than the other group. We have also seen that
there is complementarity in symmetric equilibria: when both groups plan mass
murdering in case of victory, both ght harder in the battleeld.
We can now ask what happens if M is lowered, i.e. if the threshold on
mass killings before a foreign intervention is triggered is tightened. Lowering
M obviously reduces the number of victims (conditional on there being mass
killings), and secondly it makes them less likely by shrinking the set of group
sizes for which there will be mass killings. Furthermore, in the symmetric case,
with  >  , we can easily obtain that battleeld e¤orts will also decrease.
Let us now discuss the asymmetric case where Ni < Nj , and only group j
would want to commit massacres. Di¤erentiating with respect to M in (42) we
obtain that
@i(0; M)
@ M
=
@j(0; M)
@ M
+ :
It follows that the warfare e¤ort contributed by the smaller group relative
to the e¤ort by the larger one will have increased. Consequently, q increases
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too. Therefore, again, in relative terms warfare e¤orts are substitutes for mass
killings in asymmetric equilibria.
Note that because q > 1=2 a further increase in q reduces the term q(1 
q) in (34) and in (35), the expressions for Di and D

j . Hence, the total sign
of the e¤ect of M on the absolute levels of warfare e¤orts Di and D

j cannot
unambiguously be established.
The results obtained make sense. If the life toll of being defeated decreases
because of a lower M , the threatened group decreases its warfare e¤ort. As for
the larger group, the reduced possibility of increasing its payo¤ via a larger rent
share (produced by murdering) partially compensates for a larger probability of
victory.
Overall, if the international community had to decide whether to change
policies in a way to reduce M or increase , the rst channel should denitely
be preferred, according to our analysis. However, a reduction in M also reduces
the probability of winning on the battleeld for the minority group, and hence
our analysis can also rationalize opposition to foreign intervention by leaders of
minority groups.
5 Discussion and extensions of results
5.1 Mass killing incentives do not apply to interstate con-
icts
If i and j are countries rather than groups in one country, then there are several
di¤erences with respect to the model analyzed in this paper. Internationally it
is harder to enforce treaties, hence the maximum exploitation bounds are harder
to conceive and implement. This amounts to saying that in the interstate crisis
settings, the  constraint that can be feasible is lower. If the  constraint that
can be imposed is lower, this automatically implies lower likelihood of mass
killings in interstate wars even keeping the rest of the model unchanged.
Most importantly, two separate countries do not have a common government,
do not have a common pool of resources and a common State capacity, so
the incentives to exterminate the other countrys population are lower because
these people are not claiming a proportional share of a signicant common
pool of resources. Moreover, even if two neighboring countries discover natural
resources at the borders and try to agree on a division of the future revenues, it
is less likely than in domestic arrangements that the proportionality benchmark
to group sizes would have any bearing.
5.2 Democratization and foreign "political" intervention
Let us now return to the multiple potential sources of changes in .
The parameter  captures how well powerless groups expect to be treated
de facto in a country. In this sense, NiN   g0i could be thought of as a measure
of democratization or improved minority protection. We prefer to talk about
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democratization rather than democracy, or improved minority protection rather
than absolute level of minority protection. The reason is simple: if the country
has a stable regime and there are no external or internal new pressures to change
the acceptable discrimination of minority groups, consistency would require that
the initial share for group i, g0i, be exactly equal to NiN . Thus the starting
point, interpreted in that case as a steady state of a dynamic process, would
have to be peaceful.21
On the other hand, the situations in which NiN   g0i is positive are instead
situations in which our model fully applies, capturing therefore a transition
phase, a phase in which the ruling group is expecting tighter limits to its ability
to exploit or, by the same token, the rebel group expects the time to be right
to change the unfair status quo.
Another interpretation of the variable  is how tight outside constraints are
for power-sharing. The variable  can reect foreign "political" interventions.
It may depend on the pressure on the terms of the after war settlement. This
pressure can involve conditions for qualifying for foreign aid or access to loans
from international nancial institutions. A higher  could also reect an expec-
tation of an incipient democratization process imposed from outside pressures,
leading eventually to less group discrimination. If the worlds superpower(s)
follow a so-called Neo-Con" agenda and put a lot of pressure on rogue States
and their leaders to adopt some ready-made democratic measures in favor of
powerless groups this would be reected in our model by a large .
Suppose  was small because historically the international community had
not been able to e¤ectively intervene in civil wars. In this scenario, an increase
in intervention  an increase in  has benecial e¤ects because it reduces
battleeld warfare. However, as soon as it goes above the threshold, foreign
intervention may trigger mass killings or genocide. We would obtain the same
implication if, consistently with our rst interpretation, the change is due to an
expected democratization of the country (either domestically or international
propelled).
Hence, one conclusion of our analysis is that at least in some situations
this will not work. Forcing a "bad" leader to exploit less some minority than he
would want in equilibrium may lead to a substitution and can give incentives for
killing rather than exploiting some minority. The failure of externally imposed
pseudo-"democracy" in the absence of a strong civil society has for example
been observed in Iraq, Afghanistan, and in various African States.22
In what contexts is external intervention in domestic politics (i.e. imposing
a large ) especially problematic? A large  increases the risk of mass killings.
However, if the level of natural resources E is very low, even for a large  mass
killings are not feasible. Hence, while the Neo-Con agenda of imposing democ-
racy failed in resource rich countries like Iraq they may have better chances to
21For this to be true, one should imagine that one of the determinants of the lower bound
on exploitation of minorities is indeed the elimination of the incentives to further rebellions
down the road.
22See Collier and Rohner (2008) for a systematic analysis of the conditions under which
democracy can backre.
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succeed in resource-poor countries.
5.3 Extensions of the model
The model could be easily extended by allowing each group to have di¤erent
wealth endowments, di¤erent productivity levels, and even separate control or
property rights on natural resource discoveries, rather than assuming govern-
ment control of all natural resources. Adding separate endowments wi; wj and
separate natural resource rent controls, Ei; Ej , would be easy to do, and the
results would not change qualitatively. An advantage of this extension is that it
would make the model t with the economic motivations behind the Holocaust
(signicant wealth to appropriate).
If we allowed for di¤erent distributions of property rights on natural resource
rents between private and public, our analysis would suggest that natural re-
source discoveries would typically be more dangerous if the resources are directly
owned and controlled by the government.23
A second extension to consider could be an explicit interpretation of  as
determined by the threat of future rebellions: the most the winners can ap-
propriate is the peace surplus", that is the equilibrium waste of a subsequent
civil war. This depends on the population sizes of the two groups. Therefore,
a richer analysis of strategic mass killings should include as an additional mo-
tivation that the decimation of the opponent also has an e¤ect on their future
capacity to rebel. The extension of our model to a fully dynamic framework is
in our research agenda.
Beside the potential extensions to heterogeneous parameters mentioned above,
a third important extension that could be considered relates to the description
of economic activities: it is for example realistic to allow for decreasing re-
turns in agricultural production. If one thinks of Rwanda, the really important
contestable resource there is productive land, and a combination of excessive
population and decreasing returns from agricultural production could explain
the mass killings incentives there.24 This would require only a minor modica-
tion of the production function, which we did not want to do in the benchmark
model simply for the sake of tractability.
We would like to emphasize that the logic of our model could also be useful
to capture the essential motivations behind the genocide of native American
tribes: the American Indians were holding o¤ the important development and
exploitation of the great resources of the West, and their traditional use of the
land was considered much less e¢ cient than the alternative, hence the elimina-
tion of them had both a large impact on the amount of natural resources that
it became possible to extract and on the average productivity. To capture this
story fully in the model, one would have to attribute a lower i to the Indians
and consider E as E(Ni), capturing the fact that the amount of productive
23We also nd in our empirical analysis that natural resources have a stronger impact on
mass killings if they are State-owned (regression results are available from the authors).
24Andre and Platteau (1998) show that in the genocide in Rwanda Tutsis with large land
holdings faced a particularly high risk of being targeted by the Hutu death squads.
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land and other resources exploitable by the U.S. was considered decreasing in
the size of Indian occupied territories. Only when the Indians accepted (or
were forced to accept) the clear discrimination of reservations (low ) the mass
killings stopped. In any case, it is obvious that these historical explorations are
a research subject on their own. Now we limit ourselves to the analysis of the
richer available data on mass killings occurring after World War II.
6 Empirical Analysis
We shall confront some of our predictions with the data.
One of the main purposes of the country level regressions in subsection 6.1 is
to assess how robust the existing empirical evidence on mass killings and refugees
is when important econometric issues are taken into account. Further, we want
to include in the analysis several new variables, e.g. on natural resources, that
play a crucial role in our model, but have been largely neglected in the existing
literature.
The ethnic group level analysis performed afterwards in subsection 6.2 aims
to study for the rst time what kind of ethnic groups are targeted in mass
killings. Surprisingly, the existing literature has only studied mass killings and
displacements on either a very aggregate level (i.e. with cross-country panels) or
on a very disaggregate level (i.e. case studies of single countries). Studying these
phenomena with a panel of ethnic group data makes sense, as in reality decisions
to commit massacres are strategic decisions at the group level (as emphasized
in our model).
6.1 Country level evidence
We shall start with assessing the explanatory factors of mass killings using panel
data for a cross-section of countries. Like in most of the existing literature
reviewed in section 2, we use a dummy variable for mass killings and we run
logit regressions. For the dependent variable in Table 1 we will rely on the
most widely used dataset on mass killings, collected by the "Political Instability
Task Force" under the direction of Barbara Har¤. All independent variables are
explained in detail in the Data Appendix. Our sample contains all countries
that are in the Correlates of War system, i.e. which corresponds to all countries
that have some minimum size and international recognition, and covers the years
1960-2007. This leaves us with between 2500 and 5000 observations depending
on the specication.
Most of the existing empirical literature on mass killings su¤ers from three
weaknesses which we try to address:
1) There is usually an important omitted variables bias. Most studies use a
pooled panel without controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. This is a serious
issue, as the variation between countries that experience mass killings and coun-
tries that do not can be driven by various factors that are di¢ cult to observe.
A good way to address these concerns would be to include country xed e¤ects.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Mass kill. Mass kill. Mass kill. Mass kill. Mass kill.
Incidence Incidence Incidence Incidence Onsets
Incidence mass killings (t-1) 7.08*** 8.14*** 7.09***
(0.55) (1.15) (0.92)
Oil production / GDP (t-1) 15.05*** 24.17*** 13.33***
(4.15) (7.14) (4.26)
Oil reserves / GDP (t-1) 60.72***
(15.53)
GDP per capita (t-1) -0.00*** -0.00 -0.00*** -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Ethnic polarization 1.86*** 2.93** 5.11** 5.44* 2.91
(0.51) (1.42) (2.25) (2.79) (1.81)
Democracy (t-1) -0.11*** -0.01 -0.08* -0.04 -0.03
(0.02) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
Democratiz. between (t-2) and (t-1) 0.09 0.01 -0.02 0.03
(0.09) (0.06) (0.06) (0.03)
Chief executive is military officer 1.08** 0.79* 1.08* 1.53**
(0.51) (0.43) (0.58) (0.73)
Population (t-1) 0.00*** -0.00** -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Trade / GDP (t-1) -0.02*** -0.02** -0.02** -0.04*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Mountainous terrain -0.01 -0.03* -0.02 0.00
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Civil war incidence 2.69*** 1.96*** 3.15*** 2.11*** 0.93
(0.19) (0.64) (1.06) (0.76) (0.90)
Population density (t-1) 0.00 0.00** 0.00** 0.00**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Average age of political parties -0.03
(0.02)
Std. errors clustered by country No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4809 3197 2659 2574 3115
Pseudo R2 0.273 0.816 0.877 0.835 0.180
Log likelihood -473.2 -74.92 -41.21 -42.61 -40.75
Note: Sample: 1960-2007. Logit regressions with intercept.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard
errors in parenthesis.
Table 1: Regressions on Mass Killings
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(1) (2) (3)
Refugees Refugees Refugees
Refugees (t-1) 0.86*** 0.91*** 0.86***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03)
Oil production / GDP (t-1) 13,648.37 27,163.27
(25,704.15) (42,214.25)
GDP per captia (t-1) -0.03 0.07 0.11
(0.15) (0.07) (0.14)
Ethnic polarization 853.41 -1,044.96
(2,130.74) (2,515.72)
Democracy (t-1) -452.55*** -162.55 -329.10
(169.27) (182.33) (278.68)
Democratiz. between (t-2) and (t-1) 260.56* 480.90**
(150.67) (208.38)
Chief executive is military officer 1,224.62 -2,016.44
(2,825.82) (4,787.65)
Population (t-1) 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Trade / GDP (t-1) -16.73 -11.88
(14.56) (17.56)
Mountainous terrain 14.39 -49.27
(50.46) (78.75)
Civil war incidence 37,501.14*** 25,712.99* 33,183.31**
(4,244.99) (13,512.34) (16,344.06)
Population density (t-1) 0.59 -0.22
(1.10) (1.53)
Average age of political parties -18.00
(33.67)
Std. errors clustered by country No Yes Yes
Observations 3073 1960 1639
R-squared 0.821 0.915 0.871
Note: Dependent variable: Total number of refugees by country of origin. Sample: 1960-
2008. OLS with intercept.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parenthesis.
Table 2: Regressions on Refugees (by country of origin)
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However, we cannot do this as some key explanatory variables like ethnic polar-
ization are not time-varying. Hence, as a reasonable compromise we will cluster
standard errors by country, which will already eliminate part of the problem.
This is also the approach adopted by Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2008).
2) The second problem is that the dependent variable mass killings is auto-
correlated over time. Put di¤erently, if in a given year mass killings occur it
becomes much more likely that they will also occur in the next year. Most
existing studies ignore this and focus on current incidence without controlling
for lagged incidence. There are two ways to address this: Adding the rst lag of
mass killings incidence, or coding a mass killing onset variable (that only takes
a value of 1 if mass killings newly start, and where ongoing mass killings are
coded as missing). We use both of these approaches in the table (the former in
columns 2 to 4, the latter in column 5).
3) The existing studies also use only a rather limited number of control
variables, which increases the omitted variable problem. We add a range of new
control variables. A further advantage we have is that most existing studies are
dated, and we have recent data.
Another reason for running our own regressions is that the existing literature
only devotes very little attention to the e¤ect of natural resources on mass
killings and displacements, which plays a crucial role in our model. The only
paper we are aware of that links natural resources to mass killings is by Querido
(2009). However, it only studies a sub-sample of countries (Africa), and uses
PRIO data on whether there are natural resource deposits in a country. This
data has the advantage of being geo-referenced (which makes it valuable for
analysis on the local or regional level), but it is not ideal for cross-country
panels, as the ones used by us or Querido, as it does not contain information on
the value of resources. Furthermore, Querido only includes the level of natural
resources, which is per se not a disadvantage, but makes it hard to assess our
models predictions, which are about the ratio of natural resources to GDP. To
address these issues, we use in our global sample a standard measure of the
value of oil production from British Petroleum (2009), divided by the countrys
GDP.
Table 1 displays our results. In the rst column we include the variables
that have attracted most attention in the existing literature: GDP per capita,
ethnic polarization, democracy, population and civil war incidence. Like in
most of the existing literature we do not control for auto-correlation of the
dependent variable, we do not use clustered standard errors and we add no
further controls. The results are in line with the existing studies and all variables
have the expected sign and are highly signicant: High GDP per capita and
democracy reduce the risk of mass killings, while ethnic polarization, a large
population and the presence of civil war increases the risk.
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From column 2 on we now add clustered standard errors, we include the
lagged mass killings and several additional control variables. The ndings are
as follows: A large ratio of oil production (resp. oil reserves) over GDP increases
the risk of mass killings in all columns at a signicance level of 1 percent. Also
ethnic polarization signicantly increases the mass killings risk in most columns.
In contrast, GDP per capita and democracy levels are now usually insignicant.
Democratization (i.e. the recent change in democracy levels) has a positive
sign, but is insignicant. So is population and mountainous terrain. Having a
military o¢ cer as chief executive, being in the presence of civil war and having
a large population density are all factors that signicantly increase the risk
of mass killings, while large trade over GDP signicantly decreases the mass
killings risk.
As mentioned earlier, our theory applies to any form of costly elimination
of members of the opponent group for the purpose of maximizing the future
rent share. Instead of killing opponents, a group in power can take actions
to make opponents leave the country. Therefore, our theory also applies to
refugees. Table 2 displays analogous regressions as before, but with the number
of refugees (by country of origin) as dependent variable. We use the same
method and the same battery of independent variables as in Table 1. Again, all
variables are explained in the Data Appendix.
Generally speaking, the sample size with refugees is smaller, and not many
variables are signicant once all controls are in place. However, what is most
remarkable is the e¤ect of democracy and democratization on refugees. Notably,
democracy becomes insignicant once various control variables are included and
standard errors are clustered. In contrast, recent democratization increases
refugees signicantly in all columns. This is in line with our argument that when
discrimination becomes harder, there are stronger incentives for elimination /
expulsion. Also civil war incidence and past refugee levels signicantly increase
the refugee levels in a given country and year.
6.2 Ethnic group level evidence
While the two tables in the last subsection used panels at the country year level,
the table in this subsection uses a panel on the ethnic group year level. Hence,
while the rst two tables gave us the big picture of the main driving factors
of mass killings and refugees, this third table allows us to study what kind of
ethnic groups become victims of military massacres of civilians and of forced
resettlements. As mentioned, to the best of our knowledge we are the rst ones
who study these two dependent variables at the ethnic group level.
To construct the dataset, we use as starting point the dataset of the Mi-
norities at Risk (MAR) project which follows a multitude of ethnic minority
groups over several years. There have been a few papers that used similar data
on the ethnic group level for assessing issues related to conict, like e.g. Walter
(2006). However, our analysis has two main novelties with respect to existing
work: First, to the best of our knowledge we are the rst ones to apply this
data to the study of massacres and forced displacements. Second, and more
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importantly, we build a group-level variable of natural resource wealth. So far,
only natural resource data on the country level has been used in related papers.
Our group-level variable of petrol wealth allows us to identify more precisely
whether groups in petrol-rich areas become more attractive targets for strategic
elimination.
All data is explained in detail in the data appendix. Below we will focus on
describing the construction of our novel independent variable, the percentage
of a groups territory covered with oil and gas. First, we matched the eth-
nic groups in the MAR dataset with the ethnic group in the Geo-referencing
of ethnic groups (GREG) dataset (Weidmann, Rod and Cederman, 2010),
which allowed us to know the geographical coordinates of where a given ethnic
group settles. Then we merged this with the geo-referenced petroleum dataset
(PETRODATA) from Lujala, Rod and Thieme (2007), which tells us where oil
elds lie. Combining this information we were able to compute a variable mea-
suring which part of the territory occupied by a given ethnic group contains oil.
This yields a relatively precise measure of how petrol-rich the homelands of a
given ethnic group are. According to our theory we expect groups that live in
petrol-rich areas, but are economically relatively unproductive, to be attractive
targets for the ruling groups. By attacking such groups the government can
substantially increase its share and total amount of natural resource rents, but
only marginally decreases the production output.
To study this we run logit, resp. ordered logit regressions for our panel.
To control for unobserved heterogeneity we cluster errors at the country level
and we add several standard country-level control variables. The real focus of
table 3, however, lies on the e¤ects of the group-level variables: With respect
to massacres, we nd that indeed groups that are rich in natural resources and
relatively unproductive (i.e. having a large economic di¤erential) are privileged
targets. Relatively large minority groups who are serious contenders for political
power are more likely to be victimized (note that all groups included in our
dataset are minorities, with population shares typically well below 50%). While
being of a di¤erent race does not increase the risk of being victimized, having
a di¤erent religion does. Variables related to regional identity and autonomy
grievances are not signicant.
For resettlement, similar group-level variables matter: Again, groups that
are more natural resource rich are more likely to be forcefully resettled, and
groups speaking di¤erent languages than the majority are also more likely to
su¤er this fate. As before, identity and grievances do not seem to play a large
role.
7 Conclusions
We have built a model of civil conict in which the two main groups (ethnic,
religious, or political) struggling for the control of the government can engage
in costly ghting but can also choose to perpetrate mass killings. Mass killings
can be enacted in the model only by the group in power, either in the absence
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of rebellion or after winning a civil war. The common resources the groups ght
about are the tax revenue of the State and the rents from natural resources.
While the groupsexpected utility is concave in their ghting e¤ort, their
expected utility turns out to be convex in mass killings, and hence the killings
of civilians either do not happen or are performed at a large scale. Mass killings
are chosen in the region of parameters characterized by many natural resources
in the common pool and high expected pressure (international pressure for ex-
ample) to maintain surplus sharing close to the shares proportional to relative
population size. If the winner of a civil war expects such limitations to ex-
ploitation of the other group in terms of shares of the future common pools
of resources, then the temptation arises to simply eliminate the people them-
selves who would have claims on such common resources. In other words, under
high pressure on the post-conict distributional shares, the only potential ben-
et from being in power is the possibility of cutting the population numbers of
the opposing group. The main reasons why we only very rarely observe mass
killings of civilians in conjunction with interstate wars, are that the enforcement
of treaties on lower bounds of exploitation is less likely in interstate conicts and
that there do typically not exist common pools of resources on which countries
can be assigned xed sharing dependent on population sizes by a supra-national
government.
Our analysis allows us to reach as well some novel and nuanced predictions
about the connection between mass killings and ghting e¤orts. In not very
polarized societies we end up in asymmetric equilibria where only the larger
group would want to commit massacres if in power. In such settings the smaller
group compensates for this by ghting harder in the rst place. Hence, we
can think in this case of mass killings and ghting e¤orts to be substitutes. In
contrast, in polarized societies either both or none of the groups would want to
engage in massacres when in power. We show that when the equilibrium features
mass killings in the nal stage, groups will ght harder. Thus, in symmetric
equilibria mass killings and ghting e¤orts behave as complements.
We further nd that productivity, state capacity and low proportionality
constraints for rent sharing all tend to reduce the incentives for massacres, but
increase the incentives for ghting. In contrast, natural resources are found to
increase both the scope for ghting and for mass killings.
The paper also contains some novel empirical results: We show that the
ratio of natural resource rents over GDP is a powerful predictor of mass killings
in a global country level sample. More importantly, we are to the best of
our knowledge the rst ones to study the incentives for massacres and forced
resettlements with a panel at the ethnic group level. This allows us to show that
mostly groups with large natural resource holdings and a low productivity are
victimized.
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Data Appendix
This appendix describes the data used in section 6.
Chief Executive is Military O¢ cer: Dummy variable taking a value of 1 if
the chief executive has an o¢ cer rank. From Beck et al. (2001), updated version
2007.
Civil War Incidence: Dummy taking a value of 1 when there is a civil war
ongoing. From Gleditsch and Ward (2007).
Democracy: Polity scores ranging from -10 (strongly autocratic) to +10
(strongly democratic). From Polity IV (2009).
Democratization: (Absolute) change in the democracy scores (cf. above).
Ethnic Polarization: Continuous measure going from 0 (minimum) to 1
(maximum). From Reynol-Querol (2009).
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GDP per Capita: At constant 2000 US$. From World Bank (2009).
Group di¤erent language: Dummy taking a value of 1 if an ethnic group
speaks another language than the dominant group(s) in society. From Minorities
at Risk (2009) (coded as 1 if their variable Lang takes values of 2 or 3).
Group di¤erent race: Dummy taking a value of 1 if an ethnic group is of
another race than the dominant group(s) in society. From Minorities at Risk
(2009) (coded as 1 if their variable Race takes values of 2 or 3).
Group di¤erent religion: Dummy taking a value of 1 if an ethnic group has
a di¤erent religion than the dominant group(s) in society. From Minorities at
Risk (2009) (coded as 1 if their variable Belief takes values of 2 or 3).
Group has (strong) regional homeland: Dummy recoded from the gc2 vari-
able from Minorities at Risk (2009).
Group autonomy grievances index: Variable Autlost from Minorities at Risk
(2009). High values correspond to large grievances.
Group economic di¤erential index: Variable Ecdifxx from Minorities at Risk
(2009). High values correspond to ethnic minority groups that are economically
less productive with respect to the country average.
Group population as % of country population: From Walter (2006).
Massacres (in Table 3): Military massacres of suspected rebel supporters (on
the group level). From Minorities at Risk (2009), variable Rep22. In column (2)
of Table 3 coded as dummy, taking a value of 1 when Rep22 equals 1 or more.
Mass Killings (in Tables 1 and 2): Dummy variable taking a value of 1 when
mass killings are reported. From Political Instability Task Force (2010).
Mountainous Terrain: Percentage of territory covered by mountains. From
Collier et al. (2009).
Oil Production: In million tones. From British Petroleum (2009).
Oil Reserves: Proved reserves in thousand million barrels. From British
Petroleum (2009).
Party Age: Average age of the main government and opposition parties.
From Beck et al. (2001), updated version 2007.
Percentage of group territory covered with oil and gas: As explained in the
main text.
Percentage of group territory covered with oil: As explained in the main
text.
Population: From World Bank (2009).
Population Density: From World Bank (2009).
Refugees (in Tables 1 and 2): Total number of refugees by country of origin.
From UNHCR (2010).
Resettlements (in Table 3): Forced resettlements (on the group level). From
Minorities at Risk (2009), variable Rep12. In column (5) of Table 3 coded as
dummy, taking a value of 1 when Rep12 equals 1 or more.
Trade over GDP: Total value of trade divided by total GDP. From World
Bank (2009).
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